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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the Department
of the Navy ADP system accreditation process as it relates
to shipboard microcomputers. The primary reference
document, OPNAVINST 52 39. 1A, is the Department of the Navy
Automatic Data Processing Security Program instruction,
which details the accreditation process. The accreditation
process and limitations of the instruction are discussed.
An alternative method for determining ADP systems
safeguards, the baseline security safeguard model used by
the U.S. Geological Survey, is evaluated to determine its
applicability in the shipboard microcomputer environment.
Additionally, the Nelson/DOD model, which uses cost and
proved effectiveness as metrics to select countermeasures,
is developed and discussed.
This thesis concludes that a more cost effective means
of selecting countermeasures is needed and recommends that
the Nelson/DOD model be adopted to accomplish this goal.
Suggested further research involves creating a Decision
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I. INTRODUCTION
A . SUMMARY
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the Department
of the Navy (DON) accreditation process, in general, and how
it specifically relates to the shipboard microcomputer
environment. The goal of the DON Automated Data Processing
(ADP) security program is accreditation of all DON ADP
systems and networks, based on a review of the existing ADP
security posture. The purpose of accreditation is to ensure
the activity or network is operating at an acceptable level
of risk. Within the DON, accreditation is defined as a
policy decision by the responsible Designated Approving
Authority (DAA) . Accreditation results in a formal
declaration that appropriate security countermeasures have
been properly implemented for the ADP activity or network.
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A is the Department of the Navy
Automated Data Processing Security Program instruction. The
most significant limitation of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A is that it
lacks a valid method for making cost effectiveness a
selection criterion for countermeasures. The metric used
for selecting countermeasures is return on investment (ROI)
,
the ratio of annual savings to annual cost of additional
countermeasures. The annual savings is comprised of the
difference between the estimated annual loss expectancy
(ALE) of the ADP system before and after countermeasures are
installed. The method is questionable because it uses
estimates which are difficult to predict accurately. A
method is needed which provides a systemic approach to
determining an ADP system's most cost effective
countermeasures
.
It can be argued that another limitation of OPNAVINST
5239. 1A is that it is oriented toward main frame operations
and assumes a high level of organizational computer
expertise. This assumption may not hold true for
organizations using mini or microcomputers. Further, this
assumption complicates the accreditation process because
such organizations often lack individuals skilled in formal
ADP administrative procedures. Consequently, simplified
alternative approaches to the accreditation process should
be examined and developed.
B. AN ALTERNATIVE
Cecula (1985) advocates the use of baseline security
safeguards in organizations with many similar ADP
facilities. He postulates that if multiple risk analyses
were conducted patterns would become apparent and the
resulting recommendations would be similar. A central
assumption of this thesis is that ADP (microcomputer)
installations in the surface fleet fit this description. If
a risk analysis were conducted for every ship in the fleet
implementing a microcomputer system, patterns would become
apparent and the resulting recommendations would be very
similar, indicating that the baseline approach for security-
safeguards may be appropriate. An example of an emerging
pattern would be that the microcomputer systems aboard
different ships are being used for a common purpose by the
same groups of individuals (e.g. , the COs, XOs, and
Department Heads of these ships)
,
processing similar
information, and using similar hardware and applications
programs.
For instance, the senior watch officers are all
responsible for maintaining the viability of their
respective in-port and at sea watch organizations. They can
use a microcomputer data base application to track
watchstanders, their gualif ications, and rotation dates.
The operations officers are all responsible for maintaining
their ships' Unitreps (Unit Reporting System). They can
also use a data base program to track selected exercises,
personnel information, information pertinent to the ship's
schedule, and the status of outstanding material casualties.
The legal officers are responsible for generating the
necessary documents for administrative discharge
proceedings. They may be inputting this information into
standardized formats using a word processing program. The
use of standard operating procedures and the author's past
professional experience indicates that there are no
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significant differences in who uses these systems, how the
systems are used, or what the systems uses are.
C. METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis provides a general, standardized model which
satisfies the initial accreditation requirements as set
forth in OPNAVINST 5239. 1A. The method is developed by
first discussing and analyzing the DON accreditation
process. Limitations of the DON model are then addressed
and alternatives examined.
The model developed in this thesis is based upon a
generalization of this shipboard ADP environment and makes
the following assumptions:
- the level of data processed is Level I, classified
information; Level II, unclassified information
requiring special protection; and Level III, all other
unclassified data.
- the security mode of operation is the Dedicated
Security Mode. An ADP system is operating in the
dedicated security mode when the Central Computer
Facility and all of its connected peripheral devices
and remote terminals are exclusively used and
controlled by specific users or group of users having a
security clearance and need-to-know for the processing
of a particular category (ies) and type(s) of classified
material.
the ADP system configuration and locations consist of
stand alone microcomputers located in spaces with
controlled access.
the criticality of the mission is low, the present
manual system can be used effectively, although
somewhat less efficiently.
11
The following outline provides an overview of this
thesis:
CHAPTER 1. The first chapter provides a discussion of the
DON accreditation process.
CHAPTER 2 . The second chapter is an evaluation of the first
step in the accreditation process: risk analysis.
CHAPTER 3. The third chapter is a summary of the remaining
steps in the accreditation process.
CHAPTER 4. The fourth chapter is an evaluation of the USGS
baseline security model.
CHAPTER 5. The fifth chapter is a proposed alternative to
conducting a risk analysis.
CHAPTER 6. The sixth chapter is a summary of conclusions
and recommendations.
12
II. THE ACCREDITATION PROCESS
This chapter provides a discussion of the key elements
of the accreditation process. Guidance pertinent to
achieving ADP system accreditation is found in OPNAVINST
5239. 1A, the Department of the Navy Automated Data
Processing Security Program.
A. GENERAL
The Designated Approving Authority (DAA) is an official
assigned responsibility to accredit ADP elements,
activities, and networks under that official's jurisdiction.
Specific identification of this individual depends upon the
ADP environment; defined by the level of data processed, the
security mode of operation, ADP system configurations and
locations, and the criticality of the ADP system to the
organization's mission.
Accreditation is the DAA's formal declaration that
appropriate ADP security countermeasures have been properly
implemented for the activity's ADP systems or networks
consistent with the particular level of data protection
required and that the applicable steps in the accreditation
process identified by the DAA are complete.
The accreditation process is the means whereby
information pertaining to the security of an activity's ADP
computer systems or networks is collected, analyzed, and
13
submitted for approval to the appropriate DAA. The
individual steps of the accreditation process vary by level
and type of data. Accreditation requirements are defined by
Department of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence, and
Department of the Navy regulations. The DAA is responsible
for ensuring that the pertinent instructions and regulations
are followed. The DAA evaluates his activity's ADP program
to ensure compliance.
Naval activities are either accredited or not
accredited. If an activity is not accredited, computer
systems or networks may operate if the appropriate DAA has
issued an interim authority to operate. Interim authority
to operate is:
granted for a fixed period, generally one year,
based upon an approved activity ADP security plan,
contingent upon certain conditions being met (e.g.,
standard operating procedures being strengthened or
TEMPEST 1 being certified)
.
Accreditation becomes effective when a formal, dated
statement of accreditation is issued. The statement of
accreditation will identify:
the computer systems or networks being accredited,
the applicable level of data,
the security mode of operation.
1TEMPEST is defined as the study and control of
spurious electronic signals emitted from ADP equipment.
14
A review will then be made at least every five years to
verify that accreditation is still merited. This action may
occur sooner if the DAA determines that a change has been
made which voids the accreditation conditions.
B. ACCREDITATION REQUIREMENTS FOR LEVEL I AND LEVEL II DATA
As discussed in the introduction, shipboard
microcomputer systems have the capability to process
classified data (Level I) or unclassified data requiring
special protection (Level II) and do so in the dedicated
mode, which according to OPNAVINST 5239. 1A makes the
commanding officer the DAA. Commanding officers who are
their own DAA will:
(1) Conduct a risk assessment,
(2) Develop a Security Test & Evaluation Plan (ST&E) and
conduct an ST&E,
(3) Document the ST&E test results,
(4) Develop a Contingency Plan,
(5) Develop an Activity ADP Security Plan (AADPSP) and
submit it for COMNAVDAC approval,
(6) Prepare the accreditation support documentation,
(7) Issue a Statement of Accreditation as described in
paragraph 3.3c of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A,
(8) Forward information copies of the Statement of
Accreditation to COMNAVDAC.
This thesis is concerned mainly with the accreditation
process as it relates to the shipboard microcomputer
environment where the Commanding Officer is the DAA.
15
The next chapter discusses risk analysis, the first step




The initial step in the accreditation process is to
conduct a risk analysis. Two methods are used by the DON
for conducting risk analyses, which are outlined in Appendix
E of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A. Appendix E recommends that an ADP
Security Survey be conducted first in order to determine
which of the two methods should be used by defining the
scope of the risk analysis effort. The purpose of this
chapter is to present the ADP security survey and risk
analysis for the use of microcomputers aboard
cruiser/destroyer type ships. The risk analysis is
accomplished using the method indicated by the security
survey.
Within this chapter the ADP security survey and risk
analysis Methods I and II are briefly discussed. Then the
ADP security survey and risk analysis method used in the
shipboard microcomputer environment are evaluated. Finally,
an ADP Security Survey pertinent to shipboard microcomputers
is included as Appendix A of this thesis.
B. OPNAVINST 5239. 1A ADP SECURITY SURVEY
The ADP Security Survey has two sections. The first
section describes the ADP system and the second section
17
summarizes the site security profile, which encompasses
environmental issues and physical security.
The information contained in the survey is derived from
the author's knowledge of the shipboard environment and the
knowledge of ADP security specialists from NARDAC San
Francisco, California. The information is accurate to the
extent that it is representative of what one would expect to
find, in most ships, consistent with established policies
and practices. Limitations of the structure of the ADP
survey are addressed later in this chapter.
C. OPNAVINST 5239. 1A RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
A risk assessment involves a detailed examination of the
assets and procedures of the ADP activity. An enumeration
of the ADP activity's vulnerabilities and the threats that
may exploit the vulnerabilities, resulting in destruction,
disclosure-
,
or modification of data, or denial of ADP
services is critical to the successful completion of the
risk analysis. Additionally, a risk assessment considers
the current status and mission of the ADP activity. The DAA
(as stated above, in the case of a ship the DAA is the
commanding officer) determines which risk assessment methods
will be used based on the complexity of the ADP environment,
as determined in the ADP Security Survey (see Appendix A)
.
As previously stated the ADP environment is governed by the
level of data processed, the security mode of operation, the
18
ADP system configurations and locations, and the criticality
of the ADP system to the organization's mission.
Two risk assessment methods are provided in Appendix E
of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A. Method I is the standard method for
use in most ADP environments. Method II is for use in less
complex ADP environments.
D. METHOD I OVERVIEW
Risk Assessment Methodology I as presented in OPNAVINST
5239. 1A consists of the following major steps.
1. Asset Identification and Valuation
a. List and describe each asset. Particular attention
should be given to valuation of data assets since
these typically represent the greatest risk of
substantial loss.
b. For each asset determine the impact value for each
applicable impact area, where impact is defined as
destruction, disclosure, modification of data, or
denial of service to users. (Impact value ratings are
found in OPNAVINST 5239. 1A, Table E-2
.
)
c. Provide documentation to support the impact value




Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation
a. List and describe all the threats, vulnerabilities,
and existing countermeasures against each threat.
b. Give examples of how the threats might exploit the
vulnerabilities and penetrate the existing
countermeasures
.
c. Indicate the impact area(s) to which each threat
applies.
d. Estimate the frequency of successful attack for each
applicable impact area for the threat.
19




Computation of the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE)
Calculate the estimated potential annual dollar loss
to the activity based upon the identified threats,
vulnerabilities, and existing countermeasures, thus
determining the activity's overall ADP security posture.
This calculation is called the ALE and represents a
quantitative estimate of the potential average yearly
financial loss resulting from modification, destruction, or
disclosure of data, or denial of services because of
existing vulnerabilities (i.e., flaws or weaknesses) which
may permit identified threats to be realized. The ALE
provides a dollar value baseline for determining the current
ADP security posture and for accomplishing a cost-benefit
analysis of new countermeasures under consideration.
4 Evaluation and Selection of Additional
Countermeasures
a. Identify additional countermeasures which could be
applied to the activity.
b. Evaluate the effectiveness of each proposed counter-
measure to reduce the identified vulnerability and
indicate the impact on the frequency of successful
attack for the applicable threat (s).
c. Determine the cost-effectiveness of each proposed
countermeasure by analyzing the effect of its
implementation on the ALE caused by the reduction in
the frequency of successful attack. For a counter-
measure to result in a monetary savings, the amount
saved over the life cycle of the countermeasure must
exceed the cost of installation and implementation.
Any countermeasure which satisfies this test is cost-
effective. Threats which have the greatest potential
20
for harm based on their impact on the ALE indicate
where to apply countermeasures.
d. Recommend to the commanding officer an implementation
schedule for all countermeasures having a return on
investment (ROI) greater than one.
5. Proceed with Accreditation Process
A brief comment regarding Step 2 is in order before
proceeding. If Level I or II data are processed by the
system, then this portion of the risk assessment should be
classified at a level appropriate to that data, failure to
do so could result in exceptionally grave consequences.
This has not been directed by OPNAVINST 5239. 1A, however, it
seems appropriate.
E. METHOD II OVERVIEW
Risk Assessment Methodology II contains all of the
essential elements of Method I, but does not provide the
degree of detail of Method I. Also Method II does not
provide for the interaction of threats and evaluation of
threats by impact areas as does Method I. It is therefore
limited to use in less complex ADP environments.
Risk Assessment Methodology II as presented in OPNAVINST
5239. 1A consists of the following major steps.
1 . Asset Identification and Valuation
All of the assets of the ADP activity or network are
identified and assigned a dollar value based on the impact
of modification, destruction, disclosure, and denial of
21
service. In all cases, the risk assessment documentation
will provide justification for the dollar values assigned.
2
.
Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation and Annual Loss
Expectancy (ALE) Computation
All of the threats are identified and assigned a
threat value based on the probability that they will exploit
vulnerabilities and successfully attack an asset. The
threat values are based on available information and experi-
ence, evaluating vulnerability in the light of existing
countermeasures
.
The document used to compute the ALE is the risk
assessment matrix. Assets and their impact values are
listed in columns and the threats are listed in rows. The
ALE computation step is a series of mathematical computa-
tions which reflects the summation of the products of all
impact values (the value of loss or compromise of the asset)
and threat values (the probability that the threat will
occur) . (This process assumes threats are mutually exclu-
sive and does not account for their interaction.)
3
.
Selection of Additional Countermeasures
The total ALE provides a measure of the current com-
mand security practices, the risks, and provides a baseline
for evaluating which additional countermeasures would best
improve the overall ADP security posture. Countermeasures
intended to significantly reduce the vulnerabilities posed
by the threats having the highest annual loss expectancies
are to be implemented first.
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The document used to determine priorities of the
additional countermeasures is the additional counter-
measures selection worksheet. A revised ALE is calculated
using the reduced threat value in light of the additional
countermeasure to be implemented. The annual savings is the
difference between the original and revised ALE's. The
return on investment is calculated by dividing the annual
savings by the annual cost of the countermeasure. Counter-
measures are normally implemented in descending order based
upon return on investment. Deviations from this guideline
may be necessary because of budget constraints and require-
ments of higher authority.
F . SUMMARY
Detailed procedures, forms, and tables for completing
the risk assessment are provided in Appendix E of OPNAVINST
5239. 1A. Assets should be categorized as: (1) software,
(2) data, (3) hardware, (4) administrative, (5) physical,
(6) personnel, or (7) communication. The dollar amount
assigned to an asset for each impact area (destruction,
disclosure, and modification of data, denial of service to
users) represents the importance of not allowing the
particular type of damage to occur. In other words, the
dollar amount assigned represents how much money should
reasonably be spent to avoid a single incident of the type
being considered.
23
In all cases the risk assessment documentation must:
document the assumptions used in determining asset
dollar values,
- provide documentation to support the impact value
rating assigned and identify the costs included in the
impact value.
G. ANALYSIS OF THE ADP SECURITY SURVEY
One limitation of the OPNAVINST 5239. 1A Security Survey,
contained in Appendix E of the instruction, is that it does
not provide the DAA with a valid means of determining
whether to use Risk Assessment Method I or Method II, the
stated purpose for conducting the survey. There is no quan-
titative measure or logical design which gives clear-cut
guidance regarding which method should be used.
Section I, question B asks for the dollar value impact
of loss and cost to replace. At least two problems occur
which highlight the difficulty of providing clear-cut
quantitative guidance:
First, the dollar value for data ultimately used in the
Annual Loss Expectancy calculation, appears to be more
oriented toward justifying expenditures for counter-
measures than reflecting the true impact of compromise.
(For instance, step 3 of Risk Assessment Method I
states that the ALE provides a dollar value baseline
for determining the current ADP security posture and
for accomplishing a cost-benefit analysis of new
countermeasures under consideration) . Additionally,
the impact of the loss of classified information in
dollar terms and the probability that a threat impacts
an asset may be impossible to accurately assess.
Second, the amounts disregard the anticipated life of
the equipment. The values should be discounted to pro-
vide a net present value analysis, which would provide
a more accurate assessment of system value versus
present cost.
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Section II of the survey lists several vulnerabilities
and the operating countermeasures and asks the respondent to
assess the risk as high, moderate, or low. Appendix F of
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A provides limited guidance relative to how
this is to be accomplished. For instance, section F.2
provides some guidance for completing the security survey as
it relates to software countermeasures. However, the terms
high, medium, and low used to describe the confidence level
associated with these countermeasures are only defined in
general terms (e.g., the confidence level for password pro-
tection from visual observation: "Suppressing the printing
of the password is rated high, while other protection
mechanisms are rated medium"). The respondent must make a
subjective evaluation of the countermeasures' effectiveness.
Also, section F.3 provides some guidance for completing the
security survey as related to hardware countermeasures.
Again the respondent must subjectively evaluate the counter-
measures' effectiveness. An example is the level of confi-
dence provided by Protection-State Variables, "Depending
upon how well the system software uses protection-state
variables, this countermeasure ranges from low to high."
As the analysis suggests, the choice of whether to use
Method I or II is based primarily upon subjective judgments
of the DAA.
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H. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ADP SECURITY SURVEY
A pragmatic approach that is most often used in practice
by security specialists at NARDAC, San Francisco,
California, is to determine which method to use based on the
following three criteria:
if the system cost exceeds some minimum amount (in
practice approximately $1,000,000),
and Level I or II data are used in the system (classi-
fied information and unclassified information requiring
special protection)
,
and the ADP system is critical to the accomplishment of
the organization's mission;
then Risk Assessment Method I is used. If any one of the
three criteria is not met, then Method II is used. This
approach is used because the survey does not provide the DAA
with adequate guidance (Sharp, 1986)
.
The first two criteria can be evaluated on the basis of
archival data. Evaluation of the third criterion_ is made as
follows: If nothing else changes, could the activity accom-
plish its mission without the use of the ADP system? This
is a question which the DAA should be able to answer without
much difficulty.
The following decision matrix depicts the decision
graphically.
Using the pragmatic approach, Risk Assessment Method II
should be used in the shipboard microcomputer environment.
This is true because the first and third criteria are not
26
SYSTEM COST > $1M
YES AND NO
LEVEL I OR II DATA PROCESSED
AND
ADP IS MISSION CRITICAL
•
•
USE METHOD I USE METHOD II
met, the system cost is less than $1,000,000 and the ship-
board microcomputer system is not mission critical.
Appendix B contains a completed Risk Assessment for the
use of shipboard microcomputers using Method II. The risk
assessment matrix and additional countermeasures worksheet
were completed in accordance with instructions outlined in
Appendix E of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A and Chapter II of this
thesis. The risk assessment matrix is a summary of the
threats associated with the shipboard microcomputer environ-
ment. The additional countermeasures selection worksheet
lists respective countermeasures which will reduce the
threat. Threat values were taken from Table E-l of
OPNAVINGST52 3 9. 1A. Prices for the countermeasures were
taken from a recent computer products catalogue ( DEVOKE Data
Products , Summer/Fall 1985)
.
The following section is an analysis of the risk assess-
ment process which discusses some of the limitations
associated with Method II.
27
I. ANALYSIS OF RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD II
There are at least three problems with the method used
for conducting microcomputer risk analysis:
(1) One is that even though this method is for use in
less complex ADP environments, it is still mainframe
oriented.
(2) The second involves the method currently used for
calculating the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE)
.
(3) The third arises from the practice of selecting
countermeasures based upon their respective ROI.
The first problem is understandable in that the Navy has
amassed far more experience in the mainframe environment
than any other. However, this places an undue burden on
activities which must use Method II, but do not have the
level of computer expertise that would be found in the main-
frame environment. In the short term this creates a
problem. In the long term, as the use of microcomputers
proliferates, instructions will become oriented toward a
more diverse audience and at the same time the individuals
using the instructions will be more "computer literate."
(Nolan, 1975)
The second problem reguires a different type of
analysis. The ALE has two components, the impact value
rating (the dollar impact of disclosing sensitive data) and
the threat values (the probability that the threat will
occur) . The ALE is the product of the impact value rating
and the threat value, summed for each asset to yield the
TOTAL ALE BY INDIVIDUAL THREAT. The ALE s for each
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individual threat are then summed to determine the TOTAL
ALE. However, the dollar value of compromised classified
information is difficult to determine. Therefore, impact
values, based on the estimated damage caused by compromised
classified information, are suspect. Additionally, even if
the methods used to calculate threat values were sound, the
threat values must be rated as either high, medium, or low,
but no quantitative guidance regarding what constitutes a
high, medium, or low probability is given. Personnel
conducting the risk assessment are therefore left with their
best judgment and the use of historical data, if available,
to determine the range of values which defines whether the
threat for a given asset is high, medium, or low. The
validity of the process is further diluted when the system
type is new and little historical data exists to support
quantitative analysis.
One interpretation of the method used to calculate the
ALE is that if one manipulates the numbers and argues
persuasively enough (which the method allows) the cost of
any countermeasure can be justified. This could foster an
atmosphere of free spending which clearly violates the
tenets of the DON acquisition process. The author's opinion
is that a more cost effective means for identifying and
fulfilling ADP security requirements can be developed.
The third problem is that selecting countermeasures
based upon ROI does not support a systemic approach to
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providing ADP system security. For instance, if two or more
countermeasures, operating interactively, provide the
optimum ADP system security, it is unlikely that Method II
(or Method I) will reveal this (i.e., that the respective
countermeasure ' s ROI will indicate the optimal system
configuration)
.
A strong argument can be made that in the shipboard
microcomputer environment, providing security while
processing Level I information in the dedicated security
mode is people dependent. The dominant consideration is
that access to information is granted based o the individual
processing the information possessing the appropriate
security clearance and the need to know. The shipboard
microcomputer system, by itself, does not impose any unique
security requirements (with the exception of TEMPEST
considerations)
.
J. PERSONNEL AND INFORMATION SECURITY
OPNAVINST 5510. 1G is the Navy's Personnel and Informa-
tion Security Manual. This instruction contains provisions
for the assignment of an ADP Security Officer and provides
guidance pertinent to the administration of personnel and
information security.
Personnel and information security depends heavily upon
procedural controls. The officers and men serving onboard
ships are familiar with personnel and information security
procedures and the shipboard environment provides the
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required administrative support (e.g., security clearances
are maintained and access to classified information is
granted on a need-to-know basis) . Given the argument that
the shipboard microcomputer system, in and of itself, does
not impose any unique security requirements and OPNAVINST
5510. 1G contains provisions for the assignment of an ADP
Security Officer and provides guidance pertinent to the
administration of personnel and information security, one
approach would be to cover microcomputers under this
instruction.
If this were done, the following decision diagram would
depict the decision process discussed above:
SYSTEM COST > $1M
YES < AND NO
LEVEL I OR II DATA PROCESSED
AND



















William E. Perry, the executive director of the Quality
Assurance Institute, Orlando, Florida, supports this
analysis of the microcomputer security problem. Perry
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(Perry, 1986) cites the following questions which must be
addressed relative to microcomputer security:
"Didn't end users already have the same information
before the advent of microcomputers?"
"Do microcomputers really pose a significantly new
security risk?"
"Aren't the existing security policies, procedures, and
standards adequate to address microcomputers?"
His analysis concludes that the problem is personal
security not microcomputer security. The information and
programs of security concern are given to individuals, not
machines. Therefore, the real problem is a people security
problem and not a computer problem. If security is directed
at machines, it misses the real problem. He further states
that hardware and diskette security is a physical security
problem. The key is to establish and follow policies and
procedures laid down by management.
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IV. STEPS IN THE ACCREDITATION PROCESS,
THE REST OF THE STORY
The preceding chapter dealt with the first and most
controversial step in the accreditation process: risk
assessment. This chapter provides a discussion of the
remaining steps in the accreditation process. While the
discussion is general, the focus is on the process as
defined by the shipboard microcomputer environment in which
the commanding officer is the DAA. Table 4.1 lists the
steps in the DON Accreditation Process as set forth in
OPNAVINST 52 3 9. 1A.
TABLE 4.1
DON ACCREDITATION PROCEDURES, OPNAVINST 52 3 9. 1A
(1) Conduct a risk assessment
(2) Develop a Security Test & Evaluation Plan and conduct
(ST&E)
(3) Document the ST&E test results
(4) Develop a Contingency Plan
(5) Develop an Activity Automated Data Processing Security
Plan (AADPSP) and submit it for Commanding Officer Naval
Data Automation Command (COMNAVDAC) approval)
(6) Prepare the accreditation support documentation
(7) Issue a Statement of Accreditation as described in
paragraph 3.3c
(8) Forward information copies of the Statement of
Accreditation to COMNAVDAC
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A. STEP 2: DEVELOP A SECURITY TEST & EVALUATION AND
CONDUCT A SECURITY TEST & EVALUATION
When the commanding officer is the DAA, the ST&E is the
activity's responsibility. The scope of the ST&E depends on
the level of data processed and the security mode of opera-
tion. The results of the risk assessment determine the
level of detail and scope required for the ST&E.
The purpose of conducting an ST&E is to obtain technical
information to help the DAA decide whether or not to
accredit an ADP activity or network. The ST&E consists of
two interrelated phases. The first phase determines whether
the necessary countermeasures have been installed, and the
second phase determines whether the installed counter-
measures are working effectively.
1 . Mandatory Procedures
The following steps are applicable to all ADP
activities for which the commanding officer is the DAA.








(7) Personnel, procedural, and administrative
security
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(8) User/customer functions: OPNAVINST 5239. 1A
states that when possible, it is preferable for
each step to be performed by different individ-
uals. Because of the scope of the microcomputer
system used in the shipboard environment
(cruisers/destroyers) this will neither be
possible nor necessary. It would be coincidental
that qualified A*DP personnel are assigned in
combatants because these ships do not require
personnel with ADP skills. It is therefore
unlikely that there will be enough qualified ADP
personnel so that a different person can perform
each of the steps. Additionally, in the ship-
board microcomputer environment, given the neces-
sary reference material, one person should be
able to complete all 8 steps easily.
Review the risk assessment for currency and accuracy.
Identify and analyze the nature of the threats and
vulnerabilities and their respective countermeasures.
This provides the basis for the development of the
ST&E plan.
Develop the ST&E plan. The plan should describe how
each countermeasure is to be tested in order to deter-
mine its effectiveness. If unanticipated situations
arise while the ST&E is being conducted, the ST&E
should be modified accordingly.











(2) The ST&E plan should include the following items
for each element in (1) above:
- Test objectives
A Plan of Action & Milestones (POA&M) for the
test
The test team organization
Detailed test plans and procedures
Test data
Execute the ST&E plan
Document the results of the ST&E.
B. STEP 3: DOCUMENT THE ST&E TEST RESULTS
The ST&E report documents the execution and results of
the ST&E plan. The ST&E report also analyzes the findings
of the ST&E plan and lists recommendations to correct defi-
ciencies. The following is a sample ST&E report format
taken from Appendix H of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A.
Index
Executive Summary
Body of Report :











3. Test Results and Analysis
a. Test results for each area and scenarios used
b. Overview of general findings and
recommendations





Cost to implement, either actual or
projected, in terms of dollars or work
hours
impact on system operation
4
.
Analysis and recommendations regarding test
approach and procedures and future system security
testing.
5. Proposed POA&M for corrective actions and
assignment of responsibilities.
C. STEP 4: DEVELOP A CONTINGENCY PLAN
The Contingency Plan should fully document procedures
for continuity of operations. The detail and scope of the
plan depends upon the characteristics of the individual
activity. The activity contingency plan should provide
detailed procedures for all aspects of emergency, backup,
and recovery operations.
37
D. STEP 5: DEVELOP AN ACTIVITY AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING
SECURITY PLAN (AADPSP) AND SUBMIT IT FOR COMMANDING
OFFICER NAVAL DATA AUTOMATION COMMAND (COMNAVDAC)
APPROVAL
The activity ADP Security Plan (AADPSP) is a document
which establishes and updates an activity's ADP security
program. The purpose of the AADPSP is to:
promulgate activity ADP security policy and provide
guidelines for all ADP security procedures to be used
by the activity,
document the current ADP security environment, estab-
lish program objectives, and outline a POA&M for pro-
gram implementation. The POA&M is critical to the
success of the AADPSP. It identifies all activity ADP
elements and outlines a schedule for completing the
steps of the accreditation process for each ADP
element.
Appendix H of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A discusses the AADPSP and
indicates that it should address the following areas:
1. The scope of the AADPSP.
2. The commanding officer's policy statement.
3. The ADP security organization and assignment of
responsibilities.
4. Objectives for implementing the DON ADP security
program at the activity.












7. Audit/ internal review
8. Provisions for ADP security in life cycle management
9. Provisions for ADP security in hardware and software
configuration control
10. Activity accreditation schedule identifying all ADP
elements and a POA&M for completing:
(a) Risk assessments
(b) ST&Es
(c) Contingency planning and testing
(d) Accreditations
The AADPSP serves as a comprehensive document detailing the
commanding officer's desired security posture and the
ADPSO's plans for achieving these objectives. It should be
a living document for developing, updating, improving, main-
taining, and managing ADP security requirements within the
DON ADP activity. The ADPSO is responsible for developing,
implementing, and updating the AADPSP.
E. STEP 6: PREPARE THE ACCREDITATION SUPPORT DOCUMENTATION
The purpose of the Accreditation Support Documentation
is to provide information to support the request for
accreditation. It provides evidence that the ADP activity
has effectively implemented appropriate countermeasures
consistent with the protection requirements for the data
level and security mode of operation to be authorized.
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Appendix H of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A, section H.2.8 provides
guidance for preparing the accreditation support
documentation
.
The documentation includes information requested by the
DAA, such as:
1. the name, position, and telephone number of the ADP
Security Officer (ADPSO) and ADP System Security
Officer (ADPSSO) who will serve as a primary point of
contact for the accreditation;
2. the identification and location of all Automated Data
Processing Equipment (ADPE) , also equipment layout
charts and engineering diagrams;
3. line diagrams showing interconnection of ADPE,
communications lines, and protection of the lines;
4. the approximate percentage of each application cate-
gory of data to be processed (identified by project or
task) versus the level of data (Level I, II, or III)
and the type within each level (e.g., classified,
personal, financial);
5. a description of the operating system and application
software for ADP system, also descriptions of communi-
cations and network dependent applications software
for networks, if applicable;
6. the current and proposed security modes of operation;
7. a copy of the ADP Security Operating Procedures and
other applicable command security directives (e.g.,
security incident handling procedures, procedures for
control of operating system and application software
modification)
;
8. the risk assessment documentation;
9. descriptions of all countermeasures;
10. copies of previous system/network accreditations and
interim authorities to operate;
11. certification of compliance with security directives;
12. the ST&E test plans;
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13. the ST&E test reports;
14. TEMPEST accreditation, if applicable;
15. physical accreditation, if applicable;
16. the Contingency Plan;
17. the Contingency Plan test results;
18. the AADPSP;
19. and other documentation as required by ADPSO.
F. STEP 7: ISSUE A STATEMENT OF ACCREDITATION
A sample statement of accreditation is contained in
Appendix H of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A, Figure H-7
.
G. STEP 8: FORWARD INFORMATION COPIES OF THE STATEMENT OF
ACCREDITATION TO COMNAVDAC
H. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS ON STEPS 2 THROUGH 8
Steps 2 through 8 provide the follow-up and validation
for the result of Step 1, the risk analysis.
1. Steps 2 and 3
Both are concerned with developing the ST&E,
conducting the test, and documenting the results. The test
has two interrelated phases:
determine whether or not the necessary countermeasures
have been installed,
determine whether the installed countermeasures are
working effectively.
The first phase must ask the same question that is
asked in the risk analysis. As is the case with risk
analyses, determining whether or not the necessary
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counter-measures have been installed requires that the threat
be identified and well defined. The second phase is an
evaluation of the how effective the installed counter-
measures are. Since this model selects the countermeasure
with the highest ROI as determined by the risk analysis
(which has already been identified as an imprecise, subjec-
tive process) , two questions arise:
is the countermeasure selected technically sufficient
to counter the threat, and
is the countermeasure selected the most cost effective
to counter the threat.
Step 2 is designed to answer the first question.
Unfortunately, due to the limitations associated with risk
assessments, this model is unable to adequately answer the
second question, a severe limitation. Periods of national
fiscal austerity evinced by legislation such as Gramm,
Rudman, Hollings initiatives dictates that we make cost
effectiveness a priority.
Appendix C contains an abbreviated ST&E used in
conjunction with risk assessment Method II. This document
was developed by the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering
Activity, St. Inigoes, Maryland, and provides useful
guidance.
2. Step 4
Because the shipboard microcomputer system is not
mission critical, a contingency plan is not required. A
loss of processing capability for a reasonable period of
42
time would be inconvenient, but would not adversely, affect
the ship's mission since its function is administrative. If
alternate hardware exists, however, its location shall be
specified as well as the location of data/software
diskettes, back-up diskettes, and supplies, in accordance
with good management practice. Appendix D is a sample
Contingency Data Form used by NARDAC, San Francisco, which
is suitable for use in the shipboard microcomputer
environment.
3 . Steps 5 Through 8
The AADPSP is basically a policy statement which
includes guidelines and a timetable for meeting program
objectives. Steps 6 through 8 are procedural.
Theoretically, with minor modifications to how
countermeasures are selected, Steps 2 through 8 could be
used independent of the risk analysis process if an
acceptable alternative for conducting risk assessments were
identified. The ability of a particular methodology to
ensure cost effectiveness is the criteria which establishes
acceptable alternatives.
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V. THE US GEOLOGICAL SURVEY BASELINE SECURITY MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
The baseline security model was developed by the USGS
because models which had been used previously were directed
toward large computer centers. The premise was that these
models were inappropriate for use in their microcomputer
installations, which were expanding in number. Factors
critical to development of the baseline security model were
the organizational structure and the computer security
environment within the USGS.
B. GENERAL
The method employed within the USGS baseline security
model
:
- determines which of six categories describes the
computer system in question, and
implements the minimum acceptable security requirements
for that category.
The three system attributes which must be reviewed in order
to determine the computer system category are:
data sensitivity,
the system's users, and
- access afforded the system & data resources (Cecula,
1985)
.
Figure 5.1 is a tree diagram which represents how the
USGS security category is determined. The first
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determination is whether or not the data are sensitive.
Data are sensitive if they are proprietary, critical to the
mission of one of the agencies programs, or personal infor-
mation. The second determination concerns the computer
systems 1 users or user groups. If there is only one user or
a small group of users with homogenous needs, then the
system is characterized as a single user system. The third
determination involves physical access to the computer
system. If system users can only gain access through
another party then access is controlled. The set of minimum
security requirements is then defined by the category of the



























Figure 5.1. USGS Security Category Decision Tree
The category indicated by the tree diagram in Figure 5.1 is
then found in the security requirements matrix (Table 5.1).
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The letters in each column indicate by category whether the
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R R R R R R
R R R R R S
R R R R R S
R R R R R S
R R R S S S
R R S S
R R
R = required, S = suggested, = optional
A typical USGA minicomputer site usually has at least one
sensitive data base (Cecula, 1985) . It would be used by a
select group of people from the same office, placing it in
category 3. The USGS baseline security model then mandates
the following:
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conduct a risk analysis
- assign an information security officer
- review all positions requiring access to the computer
system for security sensitivity and place each one into
one of three position-sensitive categories
develop a training program
develop a physical security plan
develop a continuity of operations program
certify sensitive application software
install reasonable physical safeguards
- future contracts must provide the appropriate security
level
.
C. ANALYSIS OF THE USGS BASELINE SECURITY MODEL
The positive aspect of the USGS model is that a
determination as to which of the six categories is appro-
priate can be readily accomplished, thereby establishing
categories of risk based upon system characteristics. This
provides the conceptual basis for security baselines.
The negative aspect of this model is that all security
categories require a risk analysis. Cecula states that risk
analysis is time-consuming, costly, and often yields
questionable results. Common sense dictates that these
limitations are further exacerbated when the process is
conducted by a person unskilled in information security.
The experience of agencies within the U.S. Geological
Survey which use microcomputers extensively is that these
agencies typically lack ADP expertise, particularly
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individuals skilled in information security (Cecula, 1985)
.
These factors seem to be reasonable expectations within the
surface forces of the DON as well. This is because in all
but the most unique circumstances, the requisite expertise
will be unavailable aboard ships. It is not likely that
individuals with the requisite skills will be billeted in
ships, since the risk analysis process is mainframe/computer
center oriented.
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VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION, THE NELSON/POD MODEL
A. GENERAL
This model is based on the argument that the conven-
tional risk analysis methodology is unsatisfactory. As
discussed previously, the major problem with conducting risk
analyses is the way that the ALE is calculated. The ALE has
two components, the impact, value rating (the impact, in
dollars, of disclosure of sensitive data) and the threat
values (the probability that the threat will occur) . The
ALE is the product of the impact value rating and the threat
value, summed for each asset to yield the TOTAL ALE BY
INDIVIDUAL THREAT. The ALEs for each individual threat are
then summed to determine the TOTAL ALE (OPNAVINST 52 3 9. 1A,
Sect. E.5.3). This procedure is the same as the expected
value approach which is used for decision making under risk
(Turban and Meredith, 1985) . In the expected value
approach, decision situations in which the chance (or proba-
bility) of occurrence of each state of nature is known (or
can be estimated) are defined as decisions made under risk.
The expected value of an alternative is the sum of all
possible payoffs of that alternative, weighted by the proba-
bilities of those payoffs occurring. Expected values
calculated using subjective payoffs and probabilities (when
payoffs and the probability that a particular state of
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nature will occur must be estimated) are subject to the
biases of the individuals making the estimations (Turban and
Meredith, 1985)
.
The expected value E(a-^) is defined as:
E(ai) =. p1oil + p2Oi 2 + ... = SjPjOij
where,
a-^ = Alternative i
s-; = State of nature j
p-; = Probability that state of nature s-; will
occur
Oji = Payoff resulting from the selection of
alternative a^ when s-; occurs
This method is based upon establishing a ceiling amount
which should not be exceeded for providing safeguards and
does not, therefore, lend itself to the identification of
the most cost effective countermeasures . The expected value
represents the maximum dollar amount that one should be
willing to pay to safeguard the ADP system's assets. When
dealing with Level I data, regardless of the ADP system
configuration, the expected value approach using subjective
probabilities may yield very large numbers. Level II data
may also yield large values, but their characteristics are
such that they are less likely to do so than Level I data.
Using the ROI of different countermeasures to prioritize
their implementation can be misleading due to the limita-
tions expressed above and in Chapter II (e.g., problems
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associated with the complexity of accurately estimating
asset values, estimating the probability that a particular
state of nature will occur, and using these estimated values
in expected value calculations) . Again, expected value
figures are only useful for determining the maximum dollar
amount that one should be willing to pay to safeguard a
system's assets. The reality of funding projects with
limited budgets necessitates that cost effectiveness become
a major consideration in system development.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this model is to provide a logical
design, applicable in all ADP environments, which will
identify the most cost effective means of providing for a
particular system's security requirements. The focus of
this model is on:
designing a logical method which will identify minimum
requirements based on system characteristics as defined
by the ADP environment,
- identifying countermeasures which have been evaluated
effective to meet the minimum requirement, and
- selecting countermeasures which have the lowest
possible life cycle cost.
C. PROCEDURES
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a discussion
of the steps in the Nelson/DOD model which is intended to
replace the risk analyses process used in the DON model.
This model can be completed by the ADPSO with guidance from
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the DAA. Using the Nelson/DOD model diagram (Appendix E) in
conjunction with the following discussion is recommended.
1. Define the ADP Environment
a. Describe the system and its purpose, including manual
systems being automated,
b. What is the system configuration;
- Hardware—mainframe, mini, micro, network,
distributed system;
- Operating system—does the system require
concurrent processing?
- What level of granularity 1 must the system support?
- Software—what applications programs will be used
and what concurrency/data integrity problems may
result?
c. What is the security mode of operation?
d. What level of information will be processed?
2. Is the ADP System Critical to the Activity's Mission
If the answer to 2 . is No: Complete steps 3 through
7 and proceed to page 55, step 10.
If the answer to 2 . is Yes: Continue to step 3.
3
.
Is the Security Environment Open or Closed
a. Closed Security Environment
The security environment is closed if both of
the following conditions hold true.
a. Application developers (including maintainers, those
individuals who maintain application programs) have
^In the concurrent processing environment, granularity
refers to the level or degree to which resources will be
reserved for a single process based on the particular
scheduling algorithm being used. The levels of granularity
may be specified at either the file, record, or field level.
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sufficient clearances and authorizations to provide an
acceptable presumption by those responsible for
safeguarding classified data that the
developers/maintainers have not introduced malicious
logic. Sufficient clearance is defined as follows:
where the maximum classification of data to be
processed is Confidential or below, developers are
cleared and authorized to the same level as the most
sensitive data; where the maximum classification of
data to be processed is Secret or above, developers
have at least a Secret clearance.
b. Configuration control provides sufficient assurance
that applications are protected against the introduc-
tion of malicious logic prior to and during operation
of system applications (CSC-STD-001-83 , Sect.
4.1.3.2.3)
.
b. Open Security Environment
The security environment is open if one of the
following conditions holds true.
a. Application developers (including maintainers) do not
have sufficient clearance or authorization to provide
an acceptable presumption that they have not intro-
duced malicious logic.
b. Configuration control does not provide sufficient
assurance that applications are protected against the
introduction of malicious logic prior to and during
the operation of system applications.
If Level I or II data is being processed and the
system if operating in the open security environ-
ment, ensure that measures are taken which will




What Unique Security Requirements Result from Using
the ADP System?
Given the fact that Level I or II data are being
processed, define threats which result from using the ADP
system.
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5. For Each Unique Security Requirement, Determine If
Technical Controls/Countermeasures Are Necessary to
Satisfy the Requirement
If no: Use existing instructions pertinent to personal
and information security/administrative and procedural
controls (OPNAVINST 5510. 1G).
If Yes: 1) Calculate the risk index;
2) Using the appropriate Table select the
minimum criteria class (see Appendix F)
.
6. Do Products Exist Which Satisfy the Requirement
Check the Evaluated Products List for products which
will satisfy the unique security requirement (see Appendix
G) . List all products which satisfy the requirement.
If no "off-the-shelf" product exists, contract out
(requirement = specification)
.
The purpose of this step is to identify a range of
products with various performance characteristics and prices
which will satisfy the particular security requirement and
provide alternatives for the DAA. Since the cost of
hardware and communications is decreasing, one alternative
which the DAA should consider is purchasing additional




Select the Most Cost Effective Countermeasure for
Each Unique Requirement
The importance of the last two steps is to provide
alternatives and introduce competition, the Federal Govern-
ment's chosen method for controlling costs (OMB Circular No.
A-109) . Both provide a formalized framework which will
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Calculate the Expected Value of the ADP system
assets
The Expected Value of the ADP system assets provide
a maximum cost to be spent on the ADP system.
9 Does the Expected Value Exceed the ADP System Cost
Including Countermeasures and Implementation Costs
If Yes, proceed with Step 2 of the Accreditation
Process
;
If no, automating the system in the proposed configura-
tion is not justifiable.
The purpose of this step is to determine if the
Expected Value of the system exceeds the cost of the
proposed ADP system including implemented countermeasures.
If this is false then the cost of the system as configured
is not justifiable.
10. Is Funding Available and Is the DAA Willing to
Obligate Funds
- If no, continue using the manual system;
If yes, continue to step 11.
11. Calculate the Expected Value of the ADP System
Assets
The Expected Value of the ADP system assets provides
a maximum cost to be spent on the ADP system.
12 Does the Expected Value Exceed the ADP System Cost
Including Countermeasures and Implementation Costs ?
If yes, proceed with Step 2 of the Accreditation
Process;




The difference between the model proposed here and the
OPNAV model is that the latter assumes the ADP system will
be operating in the mainframe environment, while the former
is more generally applicable.
Providing cost effective system security may reguire
creativity. Unfortunately, at least intuitively, it seems
that creativity is a function of the knowledge level of
system designers. However, complex environments imply that
systems designers are knowledgeable, so in this environment
the problem is minimized. Less complex system configura-
tions may, to a greater extent, employ administrative
procedures, which will rely less on technical knowledge.
Again, this minimizes the impact of the unavailability of
technical expertise.
The model proposed here may replace the risk assessment
process with a potentially more cost effective means of
providing ADP system security. The model can be inserted
into step (1) of the accreditation process listed below.
DON ACCREDITATION PROCEDURES, OPNAVINST 52 3 9.1a:
(1) Use the Nelson/DOD Model to determine security
reguirements/countermeasures
;
(2) Develop an ST&E Plan and conduct an ST&E;
(3) Document the ST&E test results;




b. reevaluate in light of additional counter-measures
proposed in previous iterations;
(4) Develop a Contingency Plan;
(5) Develop an AADPSP and submit it for COMNAVDAC
approval
;
(6) Prepare the accreditation support documentation;
(7) Issue a Statement of Accreditation;
(8) Forward information copies of the Statement of
Accreditation to COMNAVDAC.
All countermeasures selected in step (7) define the
Trusted Computing Base 2 (TCB)
.
2The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is the totality of
protection mechanisms within a computer system— including
hardware firmware, and software—the combination of which is
responsible for enforcing a security policy. It creates a
basic protection environment and provides additional user
services reguired for a trusted computer system. The
ability of a trusted computing base to correctly enforce a
security policy depends solely on the mechanisms within the
TCB and on the correct input by system administrative per-
sonnel of parameters (e.g., a user's clearance) related to
the security policy.
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The intent of this thesis has been to evaluate the
process whereby DON computer systems achieve accreditation.
Emphasis has been placed on the accreditation process as it
applies to shipboard microcomputer systems, which highlights
some limitations inherent to OPNAVINST 5239. 1A.
B. CONCLUSIONS
A basic conclusion of this thesis is that the DON has
selected metrics which are inappropriate to the optimum
selection of countermeasures. Risk analysis, the first step
in the accreditation process, provides the means for
identifying the threat and selecting countermeasures. Indi-
vidual countermeasures are selected based on their respec-
tive ROI, the ratio of annual savings to the annual cost of
additional countermeasures. The annual savings are
calculated by subtracting the revised ALE from the original
ALE. Two elements make up the ALE, the asset impact value
and the threat values which are estimated for both the
original and revised ALE's. These estimates are suspect
because it can be argued that the values which comprise the
ALE can be manipulated to justify expenditures for counter-
measures. The argument made here is that given an ADP
system is critical to an organization's mission,
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counter-measures should be selected which systemically
provide security in the most cost effective manner. The
model developed in Chapter V is an attempt to accomplish
this.
The issue of what countermeasures should be employed to
secure shipboard microcomputer systems and achieve
accreditation is also dealt with in Chapter V. , The
Nelson/DOD model proposes the use of administrative proce-
dures and TEMPEST certification as the means to achieving
shipboard microcomputer accreditation.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The analysis provided leads one to the conclusion that
at least in this situation administrative structure lags
well behind technical change. Within the DON, this problem
transcends the usual difficulties experienced in updating
documentation. Administrative lag is also manifested when
directives are promulgated in that these directives
typically have limited applicability and a short useful
life.
Because OPNAVINST 5239. 1A is mainframe/computer center
oriented in an environment in which diverse mini- and
microcomputer systems are becoming prevalent, it is such an
instruction. There is, however, a remedy which provides
some relief from this problem.
Nolan's Information System Life Cycle Model (Gibson and
Nolan, 1974) demonstrates the evolutionary nature of an
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organization's information systems (IS). While the model is
not generally useful as a planning device, it can be used to
determine an organization's position in the IS life cycle
continuum. Once this position has been established,
management has an indication of where the organization's
ADP/MIS function is headed, given the organization's
requirements. This information can then be used to
generalized guidance and instructions in such a manner as to
extend their applicability and overall usefulness.
Based on OPNAVINST 5239. 1A and other factors, the
author's conclusion is that the DON is in the contagion
stage of Nolan's model. This stage is characterized by the
unplanned (in the macro sense) proliferation of hardware and
applications software with little emphasis being placed on
information as an organization resource.
Organizations in the contagion stage are likely to
experience problems associated with the proliferation of
hardware and applications, while having few qualified
individuals to perform necessary administrative functions.
Management focus is on managing equipment rather than data.
The problems experienced by the US Geological Survey and the
DON associated with the lack of experienced personnel to
provide analysis necessary for providing IS security is
indicative of this situation.
The solution to the problems of too few qualified per-
sonnel and the necessity to conduct the complex computer
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accreditation process is exacerbated by the size of the DON.
In the short term, the solution to the accreditation problem
depends upon the DON ' s ability to implement alternate means
of determining an ADP system's countermeasures which rely
less on formal risk analysis, such as the Nelson/DOD model.
However, the necessary conceptual elements comprising a
possible long term solution are available. These elements
are decision support systems (DSS) and distributed proces-
sing. DSS are characterized as interactive computer-based
systems that help decision makers utilize data and models to
solve unstructured problems (Sprague and Carlson, 1982).
Distributed processing is defined as a system in which
peripheral small processors can completely process a
transaction but are subordinate to one or more central
processors. The peripheral machines are linked to the
center, and the entire complex is designed in a coordinated
fashion. Programs and data bases are centrally prepared and
down-line loaded into the peripheral machines (Martin,
1981)
.
A DSS could be developed which would assist in the
process of determining an information system's most cost
effective set of security countermeasures, leading to
systems accreditation. In essence, Appendix E could be
automated. The DSS could then be distributed, utilizing the
Defense Data Network (DDN) , to various locations such as
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NARDACs, where local organizations could use the system with
the assistance of NARDAC personnel.
The development of such a DSS requires the completion of
the following, possibly as future research endeavors:
creation of a dialog subsystem; the capabilities of the
system must be articulated and implemented through the
dialog;
creation of a model subsystem; the capability to inte-
grate data access and decision models (in this case the
capability to model computer systems must be
developed)
;
- creation of a data base subsystem; this entails
automating the Evaluated Products List for Trusted
Computer Systems , and
link all components of the DSS using the DDN.
Unfortunately, this recommendation exceeds the DON's
present data administration capabilities and should only be
undertaken when the DON's IS have become much more mature.





SECTION I. Basic Data.
1. System Identification: Shipboard Microcomputer System




In general, the system described here is intended to be
representative of the type system presently being used
in the shipboard environment, one which supports line
functions aboard cruiser/destroyer type ships at sea.
The system hardware components consist of a central
processing unit, keyboard, CRT, and printer. System
software consists of an operating system, word
processing, and database programs. The personnel using
the system are primarily officers and chief petty
officers, but could include any individual owning a
microcomputer who is using it aboard ship. System data
includes classified and unclassified message drafts,
information covered under the Privacy Act, and
information specific to each department including
custody items, personnel gualif ications , inventories,
etc. System procedures should, at a minimum, address
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access controls, means to ensure data integrity, and
backup and recovery.
3. Equipment Location: CO, XO , and Department Head's
staterooms.
4. System Operations Contact for Security:
Name: ADP Security Officer Code:
Bldg: Room: Phone:

























(*Note: Applicable security modes are: Compartmented,
Controlled, Dedicated, System High, Multilevel, Limited
Access, as defined in Appendix A of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A.)
6. Operating System and Standard Application Software
Identifications
:
Any IBM PC Compatible DOS operating system, word
processing, database management system, etc.
7. Scope of System: (Check all that apply.)




Shared logic and single controlled area (single CPU
with multiple workstations)
.
Shared logic and more than one controlled area
(single CPU with multiple workstations)
.
Multiple processors and single controlled area
(multiple CPUs)
Used with a remote computer
time.
percent of the
Other: Multiple stand-alone microcomputers and
multiple controlled areas (many CPUs with many
workstations) .
8. Total Value of System: $6 , 000 (Dollar value
impact of loss and cost to replace)
.
A. Equipment: $5. 000
B. Software: $1. 000
C. Data: $_0
The Level I data used in this system is transitive in
nature. The predominant use of this data is in classified
message drafts. Because it is not a stored data base the
associated security problem is greatly reduced.
The $0 value for data is justified if 3 conditions are
met:
the system achieves TEMPEST certification,
training is conducted to maximize operator proficiency,
thereby reducing operator error, unintentional disclo-
sure of Level I data, and data entry errors, and
management procedures mandate periodic back-up of all
software data files.
9. Mission Relatedness
A. Primary Function (s) of the System or network:
The function of the shipboard microcomputer system
is to provide a more convenient means of conducting
administration. This is accomplished by providing
65
the CO, XO, and Department Heads a more expeditious
means of accessing, updating, and manipulating
data. The system also facilitates the preparation
of messages.
B. Contingency Plan Requirement:
Because the system is not mission critical, a
contingency plan is not required. A loss of
processing capability for a reasonable period of
time would not adversely affect the ship's mission.
If alternate hardware exists, its location shall be
specified as well as the location of data/software
diskettes, back-up diskettes, and supplies.
Section II. Site Security Profile and Minimum Requirements
for Environmental and Physical Security.
1. Vulnerability: Temperature or Humidity Outside
Normal Range.
Operating Countermeasures: (Check all that apply.)
(x) Adequate heating and controls
(x) Adequate cooling and controls
( ) Only designated personnel operate controls
( ) Functioning temperature and humidity recorder




( ) High ( ) Moderate (x) Low
2. Vulnerability: Inadequate Lighting or Electrical
Service.
Operating Countermeasures: (Check all that apply.)
(X) Adequate primary lighting
(X) Adequate emergency lighting
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(X) Adequate periodic checks of emergency lighting
(X) Adequate primary power and outlets
( ) Functioning power filters or voltage
regulators
(X) Available backup power
( ) Other: Battery back-up for soft fail
capability
Assessment of Risk:
( ) High (X) Moderate ( ) Low
Vulnerability: Improper Housekeeping.
Operating Countermeasures: (Check all that apply.)
(X) Routine cleaning schedule is adhered to
( ) Cleaning personnel are trained in computer
room procedures
( ) An ADP facility representative is present
during cleaning
( ) Dust contributors are not permitted in
equipment area (outer coats, throw rugs,
drapes, Venetian blinds, etc.)
(X) Air-conditioning filters are cleaned/replaced
regularly
(X) Floors are polished with non-flake wax using
proper buffer materials or properly damp-
mopped
( ) Carpet areas are vacuumed frequently and anti-
static spray is used regularly
( ) Smoking, eating, and drinking are not
permitted in equipment areas
( ) Other:
Assessment of Risk:
( ) High ( ) Moderate (X) Low
Threat: Water Damage.
Operating Countermeasures: (Check all that apply.)
(X) Water/steam pipes are not located above
equipment
(X) Water/steam pipes are inspected at regular
intervals
( ) Functioning humidity warning system
( ) Dry pipe sprinkler system
( ) Plastic sheets available to cover susceptible
equipment
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(X) Water detection devices
( ) Other:
Assessment of Risk:
( ) high ( ) Moderate
Threat: Fire.
(X) Low
Operating Countermeasures: (Check all that apply.)
(X) Up-to-date fire bill posted
(X) Periodic fire drills
(X) Training— fire prevention methods
(X) Training—emergency power down procedures
(X) Training—knowledge of fire detection system
(X) Training—use of fire extinguishers
(X) Training—use of fire alarm system
( ) Training—evacuation plan
(X) Training— individual responsibilities in case
of fire
( ) Functioning emergency power-off switches
(X) Sprinkler system installed
( ) Halon system installed
(X) Carbon dioxide fire extinguisher installed
( ) Smoke/heat detectors installed
(X) Functioning fire alarm system
( ) Emergency exits clearly marked
( ) Other:
Assessment of Risk:














Required but no action taken
Not required
Security Operating Procedures Handbook
Line diagrams showing interconnection
of components and physical layout
Description of countermeasures
place
Copies of previous accreditation
interim authority to operate
TEMPEST accreditation request
TEMPEST accreditation test results








( ) (X) ( ) ( ) Formal Risk Assessment
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Other (specify):
SECTION IV. Survey Data.
1. Current Status:
( ) Operating under accreditation for processing
Level data in security mode
of operation. Accreditation granted by .
Dated . (Attach a copy of statement of
accreditation.
)
( ) Operating under interim authority for
processing Level data in
security mode of operation. Interim authority
granted by . Dated . Expires
.
(Attach a copy of interim authority
to operate.)
2. Survey Prepared By:
Name: Code:
Bldg: Room: Phone:
To the best of my knowledge, the information provided in




6. Vulnerability: Unauthorized Physical Access.
Operating Countermeasures : (Check all that apply.)
(X) Perimeter fence (access to quarterdeck
controlled)
(X) Security guards (petty officer of the watch
armed)
(X) Building secured outside of normal working
hours
( ) Area alarms (motion detectors, open door
detectors, perimeter penetration detectors)
(X) Authorized access list
( ) Cypher door lock
( ) Combination door lock
(X) Recognition of authorized personnel
( ) Closed circuit television
( ) Administrative procedures
( ) Physical isolation/protection
( ) High employee morale
69
( ) Close supervision of employees





( ) High ( ) Moderate ( ) Low
SECTION III. Current status of accreditation support
documentation. (Applies to all ADP activities and networks
which will be authorized to handle Level I or Level II
data.
)
1. All ADP activities and networks which will be
authorized to handle Level I or II data must either be
accredited or be granted interim authority to operate
pending accreditation. Accreditation is based on supporting
documentation including a risk assessment. This section
provides a statement of the current status of the




RISK ASSESSMENT, METHOD II
Completing the Risk Assessment Matrix and the Additional
Countermeasures Selection Worksheet satisfies the require-
ments for Method II. Risk Assessment Matrix #1 is provided
to illustrate how easily large sums of money can be
justified. In this case $377,025 is the TOTAL ALE.
However, TEMPEST certification eliminates the
Eavesdropping threat and a training program encompassing
system use and administrative procedures will substantially
reduce the unintentional operator error, unintentional
disclosure, and unintentional data entry error threats.
Only those countermeasures not already a part of the
system are included in the calculations. Risk Assessment
Matrix #2 indicates the threats which have not yet been
countered and the Additional Countermeasures Selection
Worksheet indicates the appropriate countermeasures.
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DEVELOPMENT, CONDUCT AND REPORTING OF SECURITY
TEST AND EVALUATIONS
1. PURPOSE,
1.1. For ST&Es that are preceded by Method I risk assessments,
the checklist (Appendix C) will be used to aid in the
identification of countermeasurers and vulnerabilities required
for completion of Appendix A.
1.2. For ST&Es that are preceded by a Method II risk assessment,
the checklist will be used to obtain the data required for the
DAAs to assure the system is operating within an acceptable level
of risk.
2. ORGANIZATION.
2.1. The checklist is divided into 2 sections: Section I
contains general activity-wide questions; Section II contains
system-specific questions.
2.2. Each question has three possible answers: yes, no, and not
applicable (N/A) . 'Yes' means the requirements addressed in the
question have affirmatively been met. 'No' means that some level
of risk exists. 'N/A' means that the subject matter addressed
does not apply to the system being evaluated. A line of comments





3.1. For ST&Es preceded by Method I risk assessments, complete
the checklist and use the results in conjunction with the risk
assessment to aid in the identification of vulnerabilities and
countermeasures in Appendix A.
3.2. For ST&Es prceded by Method II risk assessments, complete
the checklist and use the results to develop an ST&E report for
submission to the DAA. Ensure the report addressess all





1. Has an ADP Security Program been established?
Comments
:




3. Has the AADPSP been approved by the Naval Data
Automation Command (NAVDAC) Code 51?
Comments
:
4. Has the Designated Approving Authority granted
activity accreditation?
Comments
5. Is the AADPSP updated as changes occur?
Comments
:
Is there evidence that top-level management
supports the ADP Security program through
such requirements as security awareness
training, documented security procedures, etc.?
Comments
7. Is the ADP security staff sufficient to support




Has an ADP Security Officer (ADPSO) been
appointed in writing by the Commanding Officer?
Comments
:
9. Does the ADPSO have a strong technical back-
qround and experience in the administration of
ADP systems?
Comments
10. Has the ADPSO received training on OPNAVINST
S239.1A?
Comments
11. Have the duties and responsibilities of the
ADPSO been defined in writing?
Comments:
12. Do the duties and responsibilities of the
ADPSO include:
a. Coordinating with the command security
manager on matters concerning ADP
security, in accordance with the security
organizational structure established by
the Commanding Officer?
Comments
b. Developing and maintaining an ADP Security
Plan (ADPSP)?
Comments
c. Ensuring that a Network Security Officer
(NSO) is appointed for networks which
are sponsored by the activity?
Comments:
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YES • NO N/A
d. Ensuring that ADP System Security




e. Ensuring that Terminal Area Security
Officers (TASOs) are appointed where
applicable for each remote facility?
Comments
f. Ensuring that an effective activity Risk
Management Program is implemented?
.
Comments
Ensuring that all ADP security incidents
or violations are investigated, documented
and reported to appropriate authorities?
Comments
:
h. Ensuring that security requirements are
included in life cycle management docu-
mentation as prescribed in SECNAV
Instructions 5000. 1A or 5231. 1A as
appropriate?
Comments
Ensuring that all procurement documents
or specifications approved within the
activity comply with ADP security
requirements?
Comments
Ensuring the contracts (DD Form 254) include
statement (s) ensuring contractor compliance





k. Ensuring the development and testing
of all contingency plans?
Comments
:
1. Ensuring the NAVAUDSVC is advised
of the development of an ADP system,
as applicable?
Comments
m. Ensuring that accreditation documentation
is developed and maintained?
Comments
n. Assisting the ADP security staff in
implementing their respective ADP security
requirements?
Comments
o. Ensuring that applicable personnel security
procedures are established?
Comments:
p. Ensuring that Security Test and Evaluations
(ST&Es) are conducted where applicable?
13. If this activity sponsors a network:
a. Has a Network Security Officer (NSO)
been appointed in writing?
Comments:
b. Have the duties and responsibilities




c. Do the duties and responsibilities
of the NSO include:
(1) Ensuring that countermeasures
and security requirements are
in the network design and that
individual nodes of the network
comply with these countermeasures
and requirements, prior to inter-




(2) Ensuring that security measures
and procedures used at network nodes
fully support the security integrity
of the network?
Comments
(3) Maintaining liaison with all
ADPSSOs in the network?
Comments
:
(4) Ensuring that all required
countermeasuers are utilized?
Comments
14. Are all ADP security violation/incidents reported
to the ADPSO?
Comments
15. Do newly assigned ADP personnel receive briefings on
a. ADP security procedures of the activity
Comments
:





c. Marking, handling and accountability
of ADP sensitive, unclassified
information?
Comments:
d. ADP emergency procedures?





A. NAME OF SYSTEM:
B. TYPE OF SYSTEM
Office Information System (OIS)
a. Has an Office Information System





b. Have the duties and responsibilities
of the OISSO been defined in writing
by the ADPSO?
Comments
c. Do the duties and responsibilities
of the OISSO include:
Comments:
(1) Being the focal point of all




(2) Executing the ADP Security
Program as it applies to





(3) Maintaining an inventory of all OIS





(4) Monitoring system activity (e.g.,
identification of the levels and
types of data handled by the OIS
systems, assignment of passwords,
review of audit trails, etc.) to







Maintaining liaison with remote
facilities served by the OIS systems
to ensure compliance with applicable
security requirements?
(6) Conducting and documenting risk
assessments for the assigned
OIS systems?
Comments
(7) Supervising, testing and monitoring,
as appropriate, changes in the OIS




(8) Implementing appropriate counter-
measures required by directive or
determined cost effective?
(9) Assisting the ADPSO in implementing
a comprehensive Activity ADP
Security Program?
Comments
(10) Developing and testing annual contingency




(ID Monitoring OIS procurements
for security impact to ensure
compliance with security
regulations and known security





d. If the OIS system has remote terminals:
(1) Have TASOs been appointed?
Comments
(2) Have the duties and responsibilities
of the TASOs been defined in writing?
Comments
(3) Do the duties and responsibilities
of the TASO include:
(a) Serving as a single point of







(b) Implementing and enforcing
all security requirements
established by the OISSO for
remote terminal areas?
(c) Ensuring all countermeasures
for remote terminal areas
are in place?
(d) Developing terminal security
procedures for OISSO approval?
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(e) Maintaining a current access
list of remote devices?
YES NO N/A
Comments:
(f) Reporting security abnormal-




(g) Returning to the OISSO products
that cannot be identified or




Have security requirements been agreed
to in writing between the host site and
remote device sites?
2. ADP System
a. Has an ADP System Security Officer (ADPSSO)
been appointed in writing?
Comments:
b. Have the duties and responsibilities of the
ADPSSO been defined in writing?
Comments
:
c. Do the duties and responsibilities of
the ADPSSO include:
(1) Being the focal point for all security
matters for the ADP systems assigned?
Comments:
(2) Executing the ADP Security
Program as it applies to the
assigned ADP systems including





(3) Maintaining an inventory of all




(4) Monitoring system activity (e.g.,
identification of the levels and
types of data handled by the ADP
systems, assignment of passwords,
review of audit trails, etc.) to
ensure compliance with security
directives and procedures?
Comments
(5) Maintaining liaison with remote
facilities served by the ADP
systems to ensure compliance




(6) Maintaining liaison with remote
facilities served by the ADP
system to ensure that a terminal
area security officer (TASO) is
designated by the served activity
where applicable?
Comments
(7) Conducting and documenting risk




(8) Supervising, testing and mon-
itoring, as appropriate, changes









(9) Implementing appropriate coun-
termeasures required by directive
or determined cost effective?
(10) Assisting the ADPSO in imple-
menting a comprehensive Activity
ADP Security Program?
Developing and testing annual
contingency plans for the assigned
ADP systems?
(12) Monitoring ADP procurements for
security impact to ensure compliance
with security regulations and known
security requirements for the assigned
ADP systems?
Comments
d. If the ADP system is a node of a network:
(1)
Comments
Have security requirements been agreed
to in writing by the network DAA and




Has an ADPSO been appointed in writing
for the node?
YES NO N/A












Have Terminal Area Security Officers
(TASOs) been appointed?
(a) Serving as a single point of con-
tact at his terminal area for the
ADPSSO?
Have the duties and responsibilities
of the TASOs been defined in writing?
Do the duties and responsibilities of
the TASO include:
(b) Implementing and enforcing all secu-
rity requirements established by
the ADPSSO for remote terminal
areas?
(c) Ensuring all countermeasures for
remote terminal areas are in-
place?
(d) Developing terminal security pro-
cedures for ADPSSO approval?
(e) Maintaining a current access list
of remote devices?
(f) Reporting security abnormalities




(g) Returning to the ADPSSO ADP prod-
ucts that cannot be identified or
which contain extraneous data?
Comments:
(4) Have security requirements been agreed
to in writing between the host site




SYSTEM ACCREDITATION YES NO N/A
1. Is this system accounted for on the ADPSO's
inventory?
Comments
Has a survey (Figure E-l in OPNAVINST 5239. 1A)
been completed on this system?
Comments
:
3. Have security operating procedures been
developed for this system?
Comments
4. Has the DAA determined if a risk assessment
is required?
Comments
5. If a risk assessment is required:
a. Has the risk assessment been performed?
Comments
:
b. Do the ADPSO and ADPSSO maintain a
copy of the risk assessment?
Comments
c. Is the risk assessment kept updated and
repeated
:
(1) At least every 5 years?
Comments
(2) When any change is made to the
facility, ADP equipment, system
software or application software








(3) When any change is made in
operational configuration,
data sensitivity, or class-
ification level?
When any change is made which
appears to invalidate the
original conditions of accred-
itation?
N/A
Has a Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E) been
prepared (only for systems processing Level I
or II data) which is sufficiently comprehensive
to ensure thorough examination and exercising of
the system's security control features and pro-
cedures and/or in combination, to determine
their effectiveness and reliability?
Comments
Has an ST&E been performed to determine the
effectiveness of countermeasures employed in
maintaining the security of the system at an
acceptable level of risk?
Comments
8. Do the ADPSO and ADPSSO maintain a copy of
the ST&E plan and results?
Comments








a. The actions required to minimize the impact
of a fire, flood, civil disorder, natural




b. Backup procedures to conduct essential ADP
operational tasks after a disruption to
the primary ADP facility?
Comments
c. Recovery procedures to permit rapid restora-
tion of the ADP facility following physical
destruction, major damage or loss of data?
Comments
:
11. Does the contingency operations plan provide for
a. Local storage of tapes and punched cards
in the central computer facility in metal
or other fire retardant cabinets?
Comments
Duplicate system tapes, startup decks, data
base save tapes, and site-unique application
program card files or tapes to be maintained
in a secure location removed from the central
computer facility?
Comments




Destruction or safeguarding of classified
material in the central computer facility
in the event that the facility must be
evacuated?
Comments
12. Has the contingency plan been tested during the
past year?
Comments






14. Do the ADPSO and ADPSSO maintain a copy of the






1. Do all personnel having unescorted
access to the system possess a
clearance and a need-to-know equal
to or higher than the highest class-
ification and all categories of data
being processed?
Comments:
2. Is an access roster maintained at each
entry point to the central computer
facility and remote terminal area?
Comments
:
3. Are escort procedures established for
controlling visitors to the central
computer facility and remote terminal
areas?
Comments
a. Are all potential escorts properly
briefed on their responsibilities?
Comments
:
b. Is a record of all visitors
maintained for 12 months?
Comments
4. During operational hours is






Are all unescorted maintenance personnel
cleared for the highest level and all
restrictive categories of classified




6. Are escorts provided for maintenance per-
sonnel who are not appropriately cleared?
Comments
:
7. Are escorts technically competent to
review the maintenance work performed?
Comments:
Are procedures to delete and add per-
sonnel to access lists implemented, in-






Does the computer facility meet the
following requirements?
a. Is the system operated within
the manufacturer's optimum




b. Are environmental systems dedicated
to the computer facility?
Comments
c. Are environmental controls regulated
by key designated personnel only?
Comments
d. Is a temperature/humidity recording
instrument installed to monitor
the system area?
Comments:
1) Is the temperature/humidity
instrument connected to an




e. Is there adequate lighting?
Comments
f. Is there emergency lighting?
Comments





h. Is electrical power reliable?
Comments
:
i. Are there voltage regulators or
other electronic devices to pre-
vent serious power fluctuations?
Comments
j. Is there an uninterruptible power
source for the facility?
Comments
k. Are cleaning procedures and schedules
established and adhered to?
Comments
1. Is an ADP representative present
during cleaning operations?
Comments
m. Is the facility overhead free of
steam and water pipes?
Comments
n. Are plastic sheets available to pro-
tect the system from water damage?
Comments
o. Is there a facility fire bill?
Comments:
p. Are emergency exits clearly marked?
Comments
:
q. Do employees receive periodic
training in the following areas





(2) Operation of emergency power?
Comments
:
3) Operation of fire detec-
tion and alarm system?
Comments
4) Operation of fire sup-
pression equipment?
Comments
(5) Building evacuation procedures?
Comments




s. Is the master power switch located
near the main entrance of the ADP
area?
Comments
t. Is the master power switch adequately








u. If the system processes critical appli-



















Is there a central fire suppression
system?
Is there automatic smoke/fire
detection equipment?
Does the smoke/fire detection equip-
ment activate an alarm at the near-
est fire station?
Are there warning signs posted out-
side tape vaults and other magnetic
storage areas to warn fire fighters
of toxic fumes?
If the facility does not operate
24-hours, is there a guard force
employed after hours and on week-
ends?
Is the guard force briefed on
emergency procedures?
Is the guard force provided
with an emergency recall bill?
Are physical access controls imple-
mented to prevent unauthorized entry









ff. Are positive personnel identification






1. Do all communications links between remote
terminal areas and the central computer
facility meet the requirements for the
transmission of the highest classification
and for all categories of data which are
contained in the system?
Comments
:
2. Are all remote terminals uniquely identified
when accessing the host?
Comments
Are all dial-up terminals disabled from
connection to the central computer facil-






1. If the ADP system processes Level I data:
a. Has a TEMPEST vulnerability
assessment been requested?
Comments




(1) Does it represent the current
equipment configuration?
c. Are all changes, repairs, and modi-
fications to TEMPEST certified ADPE
controlled so that equipment emana-










2. Are switch settings for each hardware unit
specified for each system?
Comments
:
3. Are scheduled maintenance activities mon-
itored to ensure proper reliability and
performance?
Comments





1. Is the authenticity of the operating
system or executive software verified
by comparing the registry or shipment
number of. the software package with




Prior to operational use of any new
system release, does the ADPSSO conduct
sufficient testing to verify that
the system meets the documented and
approved security specifications?
Comments
3. Are testing and debugging of new releases




4. Are all site-unique patches tested by
system software personnel?
Comments
5. Is a log of all system patches main-
tained and monitored by the ADPSSO?
Comments
6. Are all modifications to the operating
system cross-checked by two appropriately
cleared operating system programmers?
Comments
:
Are startup procedures executed as




8. Are system tapes identified in a unique
manner to distinguish them from
non-system tapes?
Comments:
9. Are system tapes protected to the
highest classification and for all
restrictive categories of data which the




10. Has a method to control access to system
tapes or disks been developed and approved
by the ADPSSO?
Comments
11. Is the ADPSSO informed of all unauthor-
ized requests for system tape access?
Comments:
12. Are system module source listings made
available to site personnel only on a
need-to-know basis and are the listings
physically protected as FOUO?
Comments:
13. Has each individual user been assigned a
unique user identification and password
which has been randomly, machine generated?
Comments
:
14. Is a password changed:
Whenever an individual knowing a
log-on password is transferred, dis-
charged, reassigned or the individual's
security clearance is reduced, suspended,




b. Whenever a password or record of pass-
word has been compromised, or is
suspected of being compromised?
Comments
:
c. At least annually?
Comments
15. Is removable media controlled at the highest
level of data processed and restricted to
users cleared for that level?
Comments
16. When no longer needed, are data purged
or declassified?
Comments
17. Does an audit record identify the reason
for system shutdown or crash?
Comments
:
18. Are system dumps taken following a
system crash?
Comments
19. Are system dumps reviewed by the ADPSSO
or site analyst?
Comments
20. Is all memory purged between periods
processing?
Comments
21. Are security specifications coordinated by
site management prior to approval of appli-






22. Are application software design reviews con-
ducted, documented, and maintained as official
records of the site?
Comments
:
23. Are system tests of new application
releases conducted?
Comments
24. If operational user files are required






1. Are effective procedures for limiting




2. Does the ADPSSO maintain a current roster
of all personnel authorized access to the
system?
Comments
3. Does the ADPSSO control the distribution of
passwords?
Comments
4. Are log-on passwords for unclassified systems
marked For Official Use Only (FOUO) ? _
Comments
:
5. Are working papers containing classified
information marked with:
a. Date of creation?
Comments
b. Highest classification of any infor-
mation contained in the product?
Comments
Are printed listings containing classified
information marked with the security classi-
fication on the top and bottom of each
page?
Comments
7. Are microfilm and microfiche conspicuously
marked on the microform media or its
container with the overall security classi-





8. Are all ADP storage devices externally
marked with:
a. The overall security classification?
Comments
:
b. Special access restrictions?
Comments
c. A permanently assigned identi-
fication/control number?
Comments
9. Do magnetic tapes have a gummed label
affixed containing:
a. Tape classif ication/declassif ication?
Comments:
b. Tape identification control number?
Comments:
10. Are removable disk packs marked with the
same information required for magnetic
tapes?
Comments
11. Are customers responsible for reviewing
and verifying the actual classification of
the product?
Comments
12. Are effective procedures for protecting
personal and other unclassified sensitive
data established and implemented?
Comments
:
13. Have procedures for maintaining an inven-





14. Is the inventory listing for devices
classified TOP SECRET or special
category verified at least semiannually?
Comments:
15. Is the inventory listing for devices




16. Is magnetic storage media being declass-
ified and disposed of as required by
Appendix C of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A?
Comments
17. Are security incidents investigated to
determine their cause, and where possible,
the corrective action to be taken?
Comments
18. Are ADP security incidents fully docu-









Alternate System Location _
Service Contract Identification
_
Location of Data/Software Diskettes
_
Location of Diskette Backups
_
Location of Supplies (i.e, ribbons,
printwheels, etc.)
List of Authorized Users
111
APPENDIX E
THE NELSON/POD MODEL DIAGRAM
The Nelson/DOD model diagram is intended to be used in
conjunction with Chapter VI.
112
What Unique Security|Require»ents Re suit

























Proceed with Step 2
of the


























Which Provide The Lowest




























NO Are Technical TES
Controls Necessary
To Sat Isfy The
Kequ I resent.































"Hill lno, To Obi lo,ate
The funds





The evaluation class appropriate for a system is
dependent on the level of security risk inherent to that
system. This risk is referred to as that system's risk
index. Risk index is defined as the disparity between the
maximum clearance of the least cleared system users and the
maximum sensitivity of data processed by a system (CSC-STD-
003-85)
.
The Computer Security Requirements are based upon this
risk index. Although there are other factors that can
influence security risk, such as mission criticality,
required denial of service protection, and threat severity,
only the risk index is used to determine the minimum class
of trusted computer system 1 to be employed, since it can be
uniformly applied in the determination of security risk.
The risk index for a system depends on the rating associated
with the system's minimum user clearance (Rm i n ) taken from
Table 1 and the rating associated with the system's maximum
data sensitivity (Rmax ) taken from Table 2.
1A system that employs sufficient hardware and software
integrity measures to allow its use for processing
simultaneously a range of sensitive or classified
information.
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The risk index is computed as follows:
Case a. If Rm j_n is less than Rmax , then the risk index is
determined by subtracting Rm j_n from Rmax - 2
Risk Index = Rmax - Rmin
Case b. If Rm in is greater than or equal to RmaX / then:
Risk Index =1, if there are categories on the system
to which some users are not authorized
access;
= 0, otherwise (i.e., if there are no cate-
gories on the system or if all users
are authorized access to all
categories)
.
^There is one anomalous case in which this formula
gives an incorrect result. This is the case where the
maximum data sensitivity is Top Secret/Background Investiga-
tion and the maximum data sensitivity is Top Secret.
According to the formula, this gives a risk index of 1. In
actuality, the risk index in this case is zero. The anomaly
results because there are two "levels" of Top Secret
clearance and only one level of Top Secret data.
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TABLK 1
COMPUTER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS KOROPEN SECURITY
ENVIRONMENTS






1 Limited Access. Controlled,
Compartmented. Multilevel
B14
o Limited Access. Controlled,
Compartmented. Multilevel
B2






'The asterisk f*) indicates that computer protection for environments with that
risk index are considered to be beyond the state of current technology. Such
environments must augment tecnnical protection with personnel or
administrative security safeguards.
2Although there is no prescribed minimum, the integrity and denial of service
requirements of many systems warrantat least class Cl protection.
3 If the system processes sensitive or classified data, at least a class C2 system is
required. If tne system does not process sensitive or classified data, a class Cl
system is sufficient.
4Where a system processes classified or compartmented data and some users do not
have at least a Confidential clearance, or when there are more than two types of
compartmented information being processed, at least a class B2 system is required.
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TABLE 2 •
COMPUTER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS KOR CLOSED SECURITY
ENVIRONMENTS

















!The asterisk (*) indicates that computer protection for environments with that
risk index are considered to be beyond the state of current technology. Such
environments must augment technical protection with physical, personnel,
and/or administrative safeguards.
-Although there is no prescribed minimum, the integrity and denial of service
requirements of many systems warrant at least class Cl protection.
^I f the system processes sensitive or classified data, at least a class C2 system is
required. If the system does not process sensitive or classified data, a ciass Cl
system is sufficient.
4Where a system processes classified or compartmented data and some users do
not have at least a Confidential clearance, at least a class B2 system is required.
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APPENDIX G
THE EVALUATED PRODUCTS LISTS FOR
TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS
The Department of Defense Computer Security Center
(DoDCSC) was established in January 1981. The primary goal
of the DoDCSC is to encourage the widespread availability of
trusted computer systems, systems that employ sufficient
hardware and software integrity measures to be used for
simultaneously processing a range of sensitive or classified
information (CSC-STD-001-83)
.
The primary means by which this goal is achieved is
through the DoDCSC s Commercial Product Evaluation Program.
This program is focused on the technical evaluation of the
protection capabilities of off-the-shelf commercially
produced and supported systems that meet the computer
security needs of government departments and agencies.
Product evaluation results are published in an Evaluated
Products List (EPL) which is independent of any considera-
tion of overall system performance, potential applications
or particular processing environment. The EPL provides an
authoritative evaluation of a system's relative suitability
for use in processing sensitive information.
The DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria is
the standard against which products are evaluated. The
"Criteria" are divided into four divisions: D (minimal pro-
tection)
,
C (discretionary protection) , B (mandatory
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protection) , and A (verified protection) , ordered in a
hierarchal manner with the highest division (A) being
reserved for systems providing the most comprehensive
security.
Each division represents a major improvement in the
overall confidence one can place in the system for the
protection of sensitive information. These divisions are
based on features and assurances to support three types of
security requirements: policy, accountability and
assurance.
Generally speaking, secure systems use specific security
features to control access to information such that only
properly authorized individuals, or processes operating in
their behalf, will have read or write access capabilities.
Six fundamental requirements are necessary to support this
objective:
Policy
Requirement 1—SECURITY POLICY—there must be an explicit
and well-defined security policy enforced by the
system.




^-An object is a passive entity that contains or
receives information. Access to an object potentially
implies access to the information it contains. Examples of
objects are: records, blocks, pages, segments, files,
directories, directory trees, and programs.
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Accountability
Requirement 3—IDENTIFICATION—Individual subjects must be
identified.
Requirement 4—ACCOUNTABILITY—Audit information must be
selectively kept and protected so that actions
affecting security can be traced to the responsible
party.
Assurance
Requirement 5—ASSURANCE—The computer system must contain
hardware/software mechanisms that can be indepen-
dently evaluated to provide sufficient assurance
that the system enforces requirements 1 through 4
above.
Requirement 6—CONTINUOUS PROTECTION—The trusted mechanisms
that enforce these basic requirements must be
continuously protected against tampering and/or
unauthorized changes.
The products on the EPL have been evaluated against the
Criteria and assigned an Overall Evaluation Class rating.
The security evaluation of a product is contained in a
formal report (NTIS) . The Overall Evaluation Class (product
rating) in the EPL is the highest class for which the
evidence for the product demonstrates that all the require-
ments in the Criteria have been met.
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